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Abstract
We prove that a general equilibrium for an economy under imperfect competition is locally
asymptotically stable, in which imperfectively competitive firms can influence a price adjustment
process.
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1. Introduction
This paper studies an asymptotic stability of a general equilibrium for an economy
under imperfect competition. The assumption of perfect competition that prices are
adjusted by a ﬁctive auctioneer may not be reasonable under imperfect competition in
which ﬁrms can inﬂuence prices. Thus, we must deﬁne another adjustment process.
Several papers have analyzed distinct adjustment processes. First, in Negishi (1961),
an excess demand in each imperfectly competitive market is always assumed to be zero.
Hence, a dynamic process in the market is a kind of a feed-back adjustment process
(Negishi, 1961, p. 199) by which ﬁrms derive the maximum proﬁt. However, the assump-
tion that the excess demand in imperfectly competitive markets is always cleared is
strong. Second, Fisher (1970, 1972) and Allingham (1976) studied a price adjustment
process conducted by individuals, not the auctioneer. The process is in a directly oppo-
site position to a typical taˆtonnement process. The supposition that every imperfectively
competitive ﬁrm can change prices in its own way is also strict as well as that prices
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are completely adjusted by the auctioneer. Thus, we take a third position that the price
adjustment process may be inﬂuenced by imperfectly competitive ﬁrms.
Because we suppose consumers act as price takers, we may derive a demand function by
the standard methods. On the other hand, we hypothesize that each ﬁrm may inﬂuence
a price of its product. Since actions of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms in the framework of
general equilibrium has been atypically treated in previous studies, we must explain the
behavior of ﬁrms in great detail. That explanation should be required in order to verify
the stability of an equilibrium in the economy. We assume that as the ﬁrm increases
or decreases output under a current price, it estimates a rate of change in price, which
is based on expected demands for its product. The ﬁrm produces its proﬁt-maximizing
output based on an anticipated price for its product. A notable feature of our economic
model is that every ﬁrm can impact on a price-adjustment process conducted by the
ﬁctive auctioneer. At the equilibrium, the ﬁrms’ estimated prices correspond with current
market prices, and excess demand in each market is cleared. Our purpose is to prove
a local and global stability of the equilibrium for the economy under the inﬂuence of
dominant ﬁrms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct our economic
model. We mention commodities and prices in Subsection 2. 1, discuss the consumption
sector in Subsection 2. 2, and study about the behavior of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms
in Subsection 2. 3. In Section 3, a general equilibrium for an economy under imperfect
competition is deﬁned, and the local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium for the
economy is proved.
2. Construction of the model
2.1. Commodities and prices
We assume that there exist s total commodities, s − 1 products, and one factor of
production, the s-th commodity. We prepare the following sets for indices of commodities:
I := {1, · · · , s};
J := {1, · · · , s− 1};
I−j := {1, · · · , j − 1, j + 1, · · · , s} for any j ∈ J ;
J−j := {1, · · · , j − 1, j + 1, · · · , s− 1} for any j ∈ J .
We postulate that the s-th commodity is provided by consumers only. This implies that
the production factor is not produced by ﬁrms. We may assume that s is an odd number
without loss of generality. Let pj denote a price of the j-th commodity for any j ∈ I.
And let p denote a price vector (p1, · · · , ps). We assume that every price vector belongs
to the set P := {p ∈ Rs|pj > 0 for any j ∈ I}.
2.2. Consumption sector
We assume that every consumer acts as a price taker. Thus, we may derive a demand
function by the standard methods and retain speciﬁcations about a consumption sector
2
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to a minimum. We consider that consumers’ total demand, x(p) := (x1(p), · · · , xs(p)), is
given. We set up the following assumption (A. 1) about the demand function.
(A. 1) (i) The total demand function x : P → Rs is of class C2;
(ii) The function x(p) is homogeneous of degree 0 for any p ∈ P ; and
(iii) The condition ∂xi(p)∂pj > 0 holds for any i and j in I (i �= j).
These conditions are standard in analyses of a stability of a general equilibrium.
2.3. Production sector
A behavior of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms in a general equilibrium analyses is not
entirely a matter of common knowledge. For this reason, we must study the behavior of
ﬁrms in detail. For the sake of simplicity, we presume that each of s− 1 ﬁrms produces
one product by inputting s− 1 types of production factors provided from the other ﬁrms
and consumers. Thus, we may designate a ﬁrm producing the j-th commodity as the j-th
ﬁrm for any j ∈ J . We suppose that: Each ﬁrm can recognize the demand for its product
at a current price. However, at prices diﬀerent from the prevailing price, the ﬁrm must
estimate demands with which it should be faced. Thus, every imperfectly competitive
ﬁrm subjectively anticipates demands for its product at each price diﬀerent from the
current price. The ﬁrm makes a prediction for a price based on the expected demands
and maximizes its proﬁt under a constraint of production technologies.
First, we discuss a production technology for each imperfectly competitive ﬁrm. Fix
any j ∈ J . Let wj := (wj1, · · · , wjj−1, wjj+1 , · · · , wjs) denote a vector of production
factors and let fj : Rs−1 → R be a production function. Subsequent to this, we use fmj
and fmnj as symbols denoting a derivative of the ﬁrst and second order of fj , that is,
fmj :=
∂fj(wj)
∂wjm
and fmnj :=
∂
∂wjn
∂fj(wj)
∂wjm
. Concerning production technologies, we set up
the following assumption (A. 2).
(A. 2) For any j ∈ J : (i) fj : Rs−1 → R is of class C2;
(ii) For any m ∈ I−j , fmj > 0; and
(iii) For any m ∈ I−j and n ∈ I−j (m �= n), fmmj < 0 and fmnj > 0;
(iv) There is some y¯j ∈ R satisfying fj(wj) < y¯j <∞ for any wj ∈ Rs−1 if wjs <∞.
Items (i) and (ii) are standard. The condition (iii) is stronger than the strict-concavity of
fj, however, we need the condition to obtain the required result. The property (iv) means
that every ﬁrm cannot produce its product inﬁnitely if an input of the s-th production
factor provided from consumers is ﬁnite. The supposition seems to be quite natural.
Then, we mention a price estimation for every ﬁrm. Fix any j ∈ J . Let ϕj ∈ (−1,∞)
denote a rate of changes in price. Then, the j-th ﬁrm’s subjective demand for its product
is denoted as follows:
ej(p1, · · · , (1 + ϕj)pj , · · · , ps).
This is abbreviately described by ej(ϕj , p). We set up the following assumption concern-
ing the function ej : (−1,∞)× P → R:
(A. 3) For any j ∈ J , ej is homogeneous of degree 0 with respect to p ∈ P .
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This assumption means that an expected demand for each ﬁrm depends only on relative
prices. That is, every ﬁrm is not possessed with the illusion that the expected demand
changes by simultaneous changes of prices.
Suppose that a price p is ﬁxed. Then we can deﬁne
ϕj : (−∞, y¯j)→ (−1,∞)
as a function associating ϕj to yj such that ej(ϕj , p) = yj holds for any j ∈ J . We set
up the following assumption (A. 4) concerning the function ϕj .
(A. 4) For any j ∈ J : (i) The function ϕj : (−∞, y¯j)→ (−1,∞) is linear;
(ii) The condition ϕ�j(yj) < 0 holds for any yj ∈ (−∞, y¯j).
We need the condition (i) to guarantee the uniqueness of the maximum solution for
each ﬁrm. The property (ii) implies that the j-th ﬁrm considers the possibility to raise
(reduce) the price of its product by a decrease (increase) in production. If the ﬁrm
inputs all production factors provided from consumers, the maximal output is y¯j or less
by (A. 2)(iv). Thus, it is reasonable that the ﬁrm considers (1 + ϕj(y¯j))pj > 0. This is
compatible with the supposition that the lower bound of the range of ϕj is −1.
As usual, we assume that every ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt:
πj(p) := max
wj
(
1 + ϕj(fj(wj)
)
pjfj(wj)−
∑
m∈ J−j
pmwjm. (1)
The ﬁrst order condition of the problem (1) for any j ∈ J is
pjf
m
j
(
1 + ϕj(yj) + ϕ�j(yj)yj
)− pm = 0 for any m ∈ I−j . (2)
For any j ∈ J , we deﬁne σj(yj) := yjϕj(yj)ϕ�j(yj). That is, 1σj(yj) is the elasticity of demand
with respect to each output yj . If we adopt the concept, the ﬁrst order condition (2) may
be rewritten as
pjf
m
j
{
1 + ϕj(yj)
(
1 + σi(yj)
)}− pm = 0 for any m ∈ J−i. (3)
Then, the second order condition of (1) is given by the negative deﬁniteness of the Hessian
matrix of the function pjfmj (1 + ϕj(fj(wj)) + ϕ
�
j(yj)fj(wj))− pm. If we deﬁne ηj by
ηj := 1 + ϕj(yj)(1 + σj(yj)),
then the Hessian matrix of the function is
Hj :=
(
pjηjf
mn
j + 2pjϕ
�
j(yj)f
m
j f
n
j , m ∈ I−j , n ∈ I−j
)
.
We establish the following lemma about the Hessian matrix.
Lemma. For any j ∈ J , Hj is negative definite under (A. 2) and (A. 4).
Proof. Fix any j ∈ J . Suppose that |H(m)j | is the m-th order principal minor for any
m = 1, · · · , s−1. It should be noted that |Hj | is written as |H(s−1)j | for convenience’ sake.
Then, the negative deﬁniteness of the matrix Hj is equivalent to the following property:
|H(1)j | < 0, |H(2)j | > 0, · · · , |H(s−1)j | > 0. Let Fj be the Hessian matrix
Fj :=
(
fmnj ; m ∈ I−j , n ∈ I−j
)
4
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and denote the m-th order principal minor of Fj by |F (m)j | for any m = 1, · · · , s − 1.
Further, for any n = 1, · · · , s− 1, let |G(n)j (m)| (1  m  n) be determinants deﬁned as
follows:∣∣G(1)j (1)∣∣ := fmj ,
∣∣G(2)j (1)∣∣ :=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
fmj f
mn
j
fnj f
nn
j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣G(2)j (2)∣∣ :=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
fmmj f
m
j
fnmj f
n
j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
...
∣∣G(s−1)j (m)∣∣ :=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f11j · · · f1j · · · f1sj
...
...
...
fs1j · · · fsj · · · fssj
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
It must be noted that f1j · · · fsj is located in the m-th column. If we deﬁne aj by
aj :=
2ϕ�j(yj)
ηj
,
the negative deﬁniteness of Hj is equivalent to the following condition (4) from the basic
properties of the determinant:∣∣H(1)j ∣∣ = pjηj(∣∣F (1)j ∣∣+ ajfmj ∣∣G(1)j (1)∣∣) < 0,∣∣H(2)j ∣∣ = (pjηj)2(∣∣F (2)j ∣∣+ ajfmj ∣∣G(2)j (1)∣∣+ ajfnj ∣∣G(2)j (2)∣∣) > 0,
...
∣∣H(s−1)j ∣∣ = (pjηj)s−1
(∣∣F (s−1)j ∣∣+ aj s−1∑
m=1
fmj
∣∣G(s−1)j (m)∣∣
)
> 0.
(4)
Suppose yj is the optimum level of output. Then, the condition, |σj(yj)| < 1, should hold
from the ﬁrst order condition (3), and thus ηj > 0. From the result and (A. 4), aj < 0 is
also true. Accordingly, the ﬁrst relation of (4) may be obtained by the assumption (A. 2).
The second relation |H(2)j | > 0, that is, |F (2)j | > 0, |G(2)j (1)| < 0 and |G(2)j (2)| < 0, also
holds by the same suppositions. Then, we verify that the property |H(3)j | < 0 is true
under the previous result |H(2)j | > 0. A cofactor expansion of |G(3)j (1)| along the ﬁrst row
is given by
∣∣G(3)j (1)∣∣ = fmj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
fnnj f
nq
j
f qnj f
qq
j
∣∣∣∣∣∣− fmnj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
fnj f
nq
j
f qj f
qq
j
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ fmqj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
fnj f
nn
j
f qj f
qn
j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
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We rearrange columns of each minor determinant of |G(3)j (1)| so that fnnj and f qqj are
diagonal elements. Needless to say, its sign must change. Then, |G(3)j (1)| is equivalent to
the following condition:∣∣G(3)j (1)∣∣ = fmj ∣∣F (2)j ∣∣− fmnj ∣∣G(2)j (1)∣∣− fmqj ∣∣G(2)j (2)∣∣.
It follows from the above results that |F (2)j | > 0, |G(2)j (1)| < 0 and |G(2)j (2)| < 0, and
(A. 4) that |G(3)j (1)| > 0. Moreover, by the same method, it is clear that |G(3)j (2)| > 0 and
|G(3)j (3)| > 0 are obtained. Therefore, since both ηj > 0 and aj < 0 hold, the condition
|H(3)j | < 0 is concluded under (A. 2).
Now, we set up the assumption of induction |H(s−2)j | < 0. The condition means that
|F (s−2)j | < 0 and |G(s−2)j (1)| > 0, · · · , |G(s−2)j (s − 2)| > 0 hold. We will use the same
method as the above argument. We consider a cofactor expansion of |G(s−1)j (1)| along
the ﬁrst row. Further, we rearrange columns of each minor determinant of |G(s−1)j (1)| so
that fnnj and f
qq
j are diagonal elements. Suppose that rj(t, t
�) denotes a positive integer
indicating the minimum number of rearrangements with respect to each (t, t�) -minor
determinant of |G(s−2)j (1)|. Then, the cofactor expansion of |G(s−1)j (1)| along the ﬁrst
row is given by∣∣G(s−1)j (1)∣∣ = (−1)1+1+r(1, 1)f1j ∣∣F (s−2)j ∣∣
+
s−2∑
n=2
(−1)1+n+r(1, n)f1nj
∣∣G(s−2)j (n)∣∣.
It is clear that r(1, 1) = 0, r(1, 2) = 0, r(1, 3) = 1, · · · , r(1, s−2) = s−4. By supposition, s
is an odd number. Therefore, the condition |G(s−1)j (1)| < 0 holds under the assumption of
induction and (A. 2). Furthermore, the conditions |G(s−1)j (2)| < 0, · · · , |G(s−1)j (s−1)| < 0
are obtained by the same method. As a result, the condition |H(s−1)j | > 0 is true by (A. 2)
since the conditions ηj > 0 and aj < 0 hold. 
For any j ∈ J , we denote a factor demand obtained as a solution of (2) as follows;
wj(p) := (wj1(p), · · · , wjj−1(p), wjj+1(p), · · · , wjs(p)). And the supply function of the j-
th product is deﬁned by yj(p) := fj(wj(p)). Thus, the excess demand function for each
commodity is deﬁned as follows:
zj(p) := xj(p) +
∑
n∈ J−j
wnj(p)− yj(p) for anyj ∈ J and
zs(p) := xs(p) +
∑
j ∈ J
wjs(p)− x¯s
where x¯s is the total initial endowment for consumers.
3. Theorem on a stability of an equilibrium
We deﬁne an equilibrium for an economy under imperfect competition as a state that
the price estimated by each ﬁrm is consistent with the market price and that the excess
6
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demand in each market is cleared. The equilibrium is precisely deﬁned as a list of a price
and an allocation satisfying the conditions: ϕj(yj(p∗)) = 0 for any j ∈ J ; and zj(p) = 0
for any j ∈ I. We verify that the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable.
Since the supply function yj is homogeneous of degree 0 for any j ∈ J by the assumption
(A. 2), we can normalize prices under (A. 1)(ii). Subsequent to this, for any j ∈ J , suppose
that pj is a relative price pj/ps of the j-th commodity to the s-th nume´raire commodity
and that p denotes a relative price vector (p1, · · · , ps−1). If zj(p) = 0 for any j ∈ J , then
zs(p) = 0 is concluded by Walras’ law. Hence, we consider an adjustment process for
excess demands of s− 1 products except the s-th production factor:
dpj(t)
dt
= ϕ∗j (p) + zj(p) for any j ∈ J (5)
where ϕ∗j (p) := ϕj(yj(p)).
Now, we are in a position to prove the local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium for
the economy.
Theorem. Under the assusmptions (A. 1) – (A. 4), the equilibrium for an economy under
imperfect competition is locally asymptotically stable.
Proof. Suppose that J(p∗) denotes the square matrix of s− 1 order deﬁned by
J(p∗) :=
(
∂ϕ∗j (p
∗)
∂pj�
+
∂zj(p∗)
∂pj�
, j ∈ J, j� ∈ J
)
.
Then, since the conditions ϕ∗j (p
∗) = 0 and zj(p∗) = 0 hold at the equilibrium, we may
approximate the above dynamical system (5) at the neighborhood of p∗ as follows:
dp(t)
dt
= J(p∗)(p− p∗). (6)
If the real part of eigenvalues of J(p∗) are negative, the required result may be obtained.
Therefore, we must show that the matrix is negative deﬁnite, which is equal to the
following two conditions:
∂ϕ∗j (p
∗)
∂pj
+
∂zj(p∗)
∂pj
< 0 for any j ∈ J and (7)
∂ϕ∗j (p
∗)
∂pj�
+
∂zj(p∗)
∂pj�
> 0 for any j ∈ J and j� ∈ J−j . (8)
The proof of the condition (7): Suppose that the following (9) and (10) hold:
∂wjm(p∗)
∂pj
> 0 for any j ∈ J and m ∈ J−j , and (9)
∂wnj(p∗)
∂pj
< 0 for any n ∈ J and j ∈ J−n. (10)
Then, it follows from (9) and (A. 2) that
∂yj(p∗)
∂pj
:=
∂fj(wj(p∗))
∂pj
=
∑
m∈ J−j
fmj
∂wjm(p∗)
∂pj
> 0. (11)
7
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Thus, the following condition also holds under the assumption (A. 4):
∂ϕ∗j (p
∗)
∂pj
:= ϕ�j(yj)
∂yj(p∗)
∂pj
< 0. (12)
Since the condition ∂xj(p
∗)
∂pj
< 0 holds by Euler’s formula under (A. 1), it follows from
(10) and (11) that
∂zj(p∗)
∂pj
:=
∂xj(p∗)
∂pj
+
�
n∈ J−j
∂wnj(p∗)
∂pj
− ∂yj(p
∗)
∂pj
< 0. (13)
From (12) and (13), the condition (7) is true and every diagonal element of J(p∗) is
negative. Thus, it remains to show that (9) and (10) are true.
The condition pj
∂fj(wj(p))
∂wjm
�
1+ϕj(fj(wj(p))) +ϕ�j(yj)fj(wj(p)
�
= pm always holds for
any j ∈ J and m ∈ I−j by (2). We obtain the following condition by diﬀerentiating both
sides of the equation with respect to pj :
H
(s−1)
j
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∂wj1(p∗)
∂pj
...
∂wjs(p∗)
∂pj
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
−f1j ηj
...
−f sj ηj
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
Suppose that Hˆ(s−1)j (m) is a matrix substituted them-th column of H
(s−1)
j for the vector
(−f1j ηj , · · · ,−f sj ηj)T , then by Cramer’s rule,
∂wjm(p∗)
∂pj
=
1��H(s−1)j ��
��Hˆ(s−1)j (m)��.
Since the determinant |Hˆ(s−1)j (m)| is equal to −ps−2j ηs−1|G(s−1)j (m)|, we obtain the
required condition (9) from Lemma, as follows:
∂wjm(p∗)
∂pj
=
1��H(s−1)j ��
�−ps−2j ηs−1��G(s−1)j (m)��� > 0.
By the same method used in the above proof of (9), we can show that the condition
(10) is true. The condition pn
∂fn(wn(p))
∂wnm
�
1+ϕj(fn(wn(p)))+ϕ�n(yn)fn(wn(p)
�
= pm holds
by the ﬁrst order condition (2) for any n ∈ J and m ∈ I−n. It follows from diﬀerentiating
both sides of the equation with respect to pj that
H(s−1)n
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∂wn1(p∗)
∂pj
...
∂wnj(p∗)
∂pj
...
∂wns(p∗)
∂pj
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
...
1
...
0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
8
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where 1 is in the j-th row. Suppose that Hˆ(s−1)n (j) is a matrix substituted the j-th column
of H(s−1)n for the vector (0, · · · , 1 , · · · , 0)T . Then, it follows from Cramer’s rule that
∂wnj(p∗)
∂pj
=
1∣∣H(s−1)n ∣∣
∣∣Hˆ(s−1)n (j)∣∣.
It is clear that |Hˆ(s−1)n (m)| is equal to |H(s−2)n |. Thus, we obtain the required condition
(10) from Lemma, as follows:
∂wnj(p∗)
∂pj
=
1∣∣H(s−1)n ∣∣
∣∣H(s−2)n ∣∣ < 0.
The condition (8) may be veriﬁed by the same method used in the proof of (7). 
9
263
92
関西大学『経済論集』第61巻第3,4号（2012年3月）
References
Allingham, M. G. (1976): “Stability of monopoly,” Econometrica, 44, No.3, 601–602.
Arrow, K. J., H. D. Brock and L. Hurwicz. (1959): “On the stability of the
competitive equilibrium, II,” Econometrica, 27, No.1, 82–109.
Fisher, F. M. (1970): “Quasi-competitive price adjustment by individual ﬁrms: a pre-
liminary paper,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2, 195–206.
Fisher, F. M. (1972): “On price adjustment without an auctioneer,” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 39, 1–16.
Negishi, T. (1961): “Monopolistic competition and general equilibrium,” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 28, 196–201.
10
264
